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EU law and Multiple Discrimination
By professor, dr jur Ruth Nielsen, Copenhagen Business School
1. Problem and main perspective
In this paper I discuss the approach in EU law to the relationship between
different rights of equality in respect of a number of protected criteria in EU
law, such as nationality, ethnic origin, gender, etc.1  
Different forms of discrimination, eg on grounds of nationality, ethnic
origin and gender interact and may reinforce each other. It is, however, an
open question how far the fight against various discriminations can
reinforce each other - some aspects are common but there are also important
differences. Protection of one equality right, eg religious freedom, may even
be invoked as justification for restrictions of equality in regard to other
criteria, eg gender, or vice versa.2 
Prohibition of discrimination both on grounds of nationality and gender
was originally introduced in EU law as a means to develop the Internal
Market. To day (2006) equality and discrimination is mainly treated in a
fundamental rights context. The EU respects, according to Article 6 EU,
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law. To the extent the European Court of Human
3 See case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925.
4 See for a comparison of the US and the EU Roseberry, Lynn: The Limits of
Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and European Community,
Copenhagen 1999.
5 See on the concept of intersectionality where gender, ethnicity, class, religion and
other identities meet Kimberle Crenshaw: Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, Stanford Law Review,
Vol 43, No 6 (July, 1991), pp 1241-1299.
6 Ontario Human Rights Commission: An Intersectional Approach To
Discrimination. Addressing Multiple Grounds in Human Rights Claims.
Discussion Paper, 2001, available at www.ohrc.on.ca/english/consultations/
intersectionality-discussion-paper.pdf.
7 Op cit p 5.
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Rights has developed rules on multiple discrimination they also form part
of EU law.3
There is a different historical development in Anglo-American and EU
equality law. In the United States and the UK race/ethnic discrimination was
one of the first equality/discrimination issues to be adressed in legislation
and legal practice. Gender equality was taken up at about the same time, but
not - as in the EU - a generation before the race/ethnic issue. In the US,4 a
Civil Rights Act was adopted in1964.  It deals primarily with race discrimi-
nation, but also  includes a ban on sex discrimination. In the UK, the first
Race Discrimination Act was adopted in 1968. It was replaced by the Race
Relations Act 1976. Sex discrimination was addressed in the Equal Pay Act
1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
Recognition of multiple discrimination in the US has been pioneered by
African American women who have demonstrated how sex discrimination
law focuses on white women and race discrimination law on black men so
that discrimination of black women is not properly covered. The concept of
‘intersectionality’5 has been developed to counteract this problem.
Intersectionality may be defined as ‘intersectional oppression [that] arises
out of the combination of various oppressions which, together, produce
something unique and distinct from any one form of discrimination standing
alone’.6 Although an intersectional analysis is relevant to any combination
of grounds, it has particular implications for race or race-related cases.7
In the EU, nationality and gender were the only equality issues on the
legal agenda from the outset in 1958 and for about  40 years. Third-country
nationals are often of a different ethnic origin than EU-nationals, so that
8 Ayres, Ian: Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, Harvard Law Review 1991 s 817 and Ayres, Ian:: Pervasive
prejudice? - unconventional evidence of race and gender discrimination, Chicago
2001.
9 The Journal Feminist Legal Studies publishes many contributions using this
perspective, see on directive 2004/113 Di Torella, Eugenia Caracciolo: The Goods
and Services Directive: Limitations and Opportunities, Feminist Legal Studies
2005 p 337.
10 See  Frug, Mary Joe: A Feminist Analysis of a Casebook? An Introductory
Explanation, i Frug, Mary Joe: Postmodern Legal Feminism, New York 1992 s 53,
Frug, Mary Joe: An Overview of the Contracts Casebook: Dis-Covering the
Gender of Contract Culture, op cit s 60, Frug, Mary Joe: Rereading Cases:
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there is some interaction between nationality and ethnic discrimination.
Likewise diferent ethnic and religious groups experience gender inequality
differently. Notwithstanding this, multiple discrimination was practically
not discussed in official EU legal texts until the 1990's. In the practical
application of EU law by monitoring bodies, etc it is still mainly up to the
national legal system whether or not multiple discrimination should be
addressed. 
There is not much of an intersectionality approach in EU law apart from
gendermainstreaming. One of the main answers in EU policy papers to the
question how multiple discrimination should be tackled is by means of
gender mainstreaming the fight against discrimination on any other ground
(ethnic origin, religion, age, etc). 
In the study of gender and society different perspectives may be applied.
In regard to EU law and gender the main perspectives are: 
1) a gender-as-a- variable perspective,
2) a feminist standpoint perspective, and 
3) a late modern gendering perspective.
As an example of a gender-as-a- variable perspective in contract law Ian
Ayres’  studiy8 on how gender and race affect the price purchasers of cars
can obtain in the US may be mentioned. Black women got the most
unfavourable price, black men the second most unfavourable, white men the
best and white women the second best price.
Authors who take a feministis standpoint perspective9 typically argue that
women should be treated better. Mary Joe Frug’s work may be mentioned
as an example.10
Challenging the Gender of Two Contract Cases, op cit s 87 and Frug, Mary Joe:
Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract
Law, op cit s 111.
11 See the report by a group established by the Council of Europe: Gender
mainstreaming. Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good
practices. Final report of Activities of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming
(EG-S-MS), Strasbourg, May 1998, available at www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/
Equality/02._Gender_mainstreaming/EG-S-MS%281998%292rev+1.asp#TopO
fPage. 
12 It is for example on the agenda of  meeting of the EU Network of legal experts in
the fields of employment, social affairs and equality between men and women, 13
– 14 February 2006.
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In a gendering perspective the focus is on the rules, institutions and
processes through which gender is created and/or reconstructed. Gender-
mainstreaming is an example of a gendering process aimed at reconstrcting
gender in a way that promotes gender equality in the meaning equal
visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of
public and private life. Gender equality is the opposite of gender inequality,
not of gender difference, and aims to promote the full participation of
women and men in society. Gender equality includes the right to be
different. This means taking into account the existing differences among
women and men, which are related to for example class, political opinion,
religion, ethnicity, race or sexual orientation, see further on the concepts
below.11 
There seems to be a trend at the EU level to treat some kinds of grounds
of discrimination (eg ethnic origin) more favourably than others (eg
religion). Experts on gender equality increasingly ask whether gender
equality is becoming a second rank priority.12 
2. Overview of EU Law related to Multiple Discrimination
2.1. From an Internal Market to a Fundamental Rights Perspective
The early free movement and gender equality provisions were market
oriented and served mainly economic purposes in connection with the
development of the internal market.
To day, equal treatment between the groups protected by EU equality law
is mainly treated as a fundamental right. 
13 See generally on Article 13 EC Barnard,  Catherine: Article 13: Through the
Looking Glass of Union citizenship in O'Keeffe, David and Patrick M. Twomey




17 COM(2003)657 p 2. 
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The Maastricht-Treaty which came into force 1.11.1993 introduced
European Union citizenship in Article 18 EC which expanded the free
movement irrespective of nationality provisions. 
Important provisions on equality were inserted into the EC Treaty by the
Amsterdam Treaty which came into force 1.5.1999. Before that date there
was only one article in the EC Treaty dealing explicitly with gender
equality, namely the equal pay provision in the then Article 119 [now after
amendment Article 141 EC]. In the Amsterdam version of the EC Treaty
there are 5 articles dealing explicitly with gender equality, two of which
(Article 137 EC and Article 141 EC) are concerned with employment and
occupation. 
With the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty EU gender equality law grew
out of the confines of employment law. Three of the new gender equality
provisions (Article 2 EC, Article 3(2) EC and Article 13 EC) govern all
areas under Community competence.
Article 13 EC13 grants power to the Council to take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Three directives have been
passed with Article 13 EC as their legal base: the Ethnic Equality
Directive,14 the Framework Employment Equality Directive in 200015 and
the Gender Equality Directive (Goods and Services) in 2004.16
In the proposal for a Directive on equal treatment in the access to and
supply of goods and services,17 the Commission explicitly stressed that the
EU approach to gender equality has developed over time, so that the original
emphasis on equal pay and on avoiding distortions of competition between
Member States has been replaced by a concern for equality as a fundamental
right.
A similar development has taken place in case law. The ECJ has, since
the ruling in Defrenne (3) in 1978, considered equality between men and
18 Case 149/77, Defrenne (No 3) [1978] ECR 1365.
19 Case 43/75, Defrenne (No 2) [1976] ECR 455 paragraph 8-11.
20 Case C-50/96, Schröder [2000] ECR I-743 paragraph 57.
21 EEC/1612/68.
22 See for details Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC,
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC,
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance).
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women a fundamental right and a general principle of law.18 In 1976, in
Defrenne (2),19 the ECJ took the view, as regards Article 141 EC on equal
pay, that it pursues a twofold purpose, both economic and social. In
Schröder,20 the ECJ went further and held that the economic goals of
avoiding distortion of competition underlying Article 141 EC are secondary
to the social aims of that provision, which constitutes the expression of a
fundamental human right.
2.2. Free Movement within the Union
The EC Treaty guarantees the free movement of goods (Article 28 EC),
workers (Article 39 EC), services (Article 49 EC) and capital(Article 56
EC) as well as freedom of establishement (Article 43 EC) by prohibiting
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The free movement of workers
provision in Article 39 EC was complemented by a Regulation on Free
Movement of Workers in 1968.21 
Within the scope of application of the EC-Treaty, and without prejudice
to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds
of nationality is prohibited by Article 12 EC. Under Article 18 EC every
citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid
down in the EC-Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.22 
As the main rule only nationals of the Member States benefit from the
free movement provisions. Article 39 EC(2) thus provides that (emphasis
added): freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimina-
tion based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
23 Under the Regulation on free movement for workers the migrant workers are
entitled to be accompanied by their family, including family members who are
third country nationals, and the member States have a number of duties towards
these family members.
24 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Chief Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. 
25 See recital (2) ‘In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the
European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are
common to the Member States, and should respect fundamental rights as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community Law.’ and
recital (3) ‘The right to equality before the law and protection against
discrimination for all persons constitutes a universal right recognised by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the International
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the
United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
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The Regulation on Free Movement of Workers provides in Article 1 that
‘any national of a Member State’ shall have the right to take up an activity
as an employed person, and to pursue such activity, within the territory of
another Member State. 
Third country nationals can only benefit from the principle of freedom
of  movement for workers to a very limited extent.23 The same applies to the
free movement rights derived from citizenship of the Union. There is ample
case law from the ECJ (European Court of Justice) on the ban on discrimi-
nation on ground of nationality both in respect of free movement of workers
and the other freedoms of movement. A number of free movement of
workers cases are about persons from ethnic minorities but the ethnic
aspects are not discussed, but the ECJ has probably to some extent taken
them into account when shaping the concept of indirect discrimination, see
below on the O’Flynn-case.24
2.3. The Ethnic Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)
The Ethnic Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect in the
Member States the principle of equal treatment. In the preamble to the
Directive there is reference to the general human rights provisions.25 There
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories.’
26 See recital (14) ‘In implementing the principle of equal treatment irrespective of
racial or ethnic origin, the Community should, in accordance with Article 3(2) of
the EC Treaty, aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men
and women, especially since women are often the victims of multiple
discrimination.’
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is also explicit reference to the gendermainstreaming provision in Art
3(2)EC.26 The scope of the Directive is very broad. It applies to all persons,
as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in
relation to:
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to
occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions,
whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional
hierarchy, including promotion;
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational
training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical
work experience;
(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay;
(d) membership of and involvement in an organisation of workers or
employers, or any organisation whose members carry on a particular
profession, including the benefits provided for by such organisations;
(e) social protection, including social security and healthcare;
(f) social advantages;
(g) education;
(h) access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the
public, including housing.
Member States are required to to draw up reports on the application of thes
Directive. The Commission's report shall in accordance with the principle
of gender mainstreaming, provide an assessment of the impact of the
measures taken on women and men.
2.4. The Framework Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for
combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age
or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to
putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment. In
27 Case C -144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [ 2005] I-0000, nyr (judgment
of 22.11.2005).
28 Council Decision of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community action
programme to combat discrimination (2001 to 2006), OJ 2000, L 303.
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the Mangold-case,27 the ECJ held that the principle of non-discrimination
on grounds of age must thus be regarded as a general principle of Communi-
ty law. 
Like in the Ethnic Equality Directive there is reference in the Preamble
to the general fundamental rights background and to the mainstreaming duty
in Article 3(2)EC. There is also a simlar duty to draw up reports. The
Framework Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) has a much
narrower scope of application than the Ethnic Equality Directive. It only
applies to point a)-d) in the above list.
2.5. The Gender Equality Directive (2004/113/EC)
Gender equality in employment and occupation is dealt with extensively in
a number of legal texts including Treaty provisions and a number of
directives.
In 2004 the scope of the prohibition on ground of sex was extended to
also cover access to and supply of goods and services.
2.6. Multiple Discrimination as a Specific Issue
Following the passing of the Ethnic Equality Directive and the Framework
Employment Directive in 2000, the Council of the EU, launched a
Community Action Programme to promote measures to combat direct or
indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation.28 In recital 4 to the Council decision it
is, in accordance with the gender mainstreaming provision in Art 3(2) EC
stated that (emphasis added): 
In the implementation of the programme, the Community will seek, in accordance
with the Treaty, to eliminate inequalities and promote equality between men and
women, particularly because women are often the victims of multiple discrimina-
tion.
In recital 5 to the Decision it is further stated that (emphasis added):
10
The different forms of discrimination cannot be ranked: all are equally intolerable.
The programme is intended both to exchange existing good practice in the Member
States and to develop new practice and policy for combating discrimination,
including multiple discrimination. This Decision may help to put in place a
comprehensive strategy for combating all forms of discrimination on different
grounds, a strategy which should henceforward be developed in parallel.
The programme runs from 2001 until 2006 and is managed by the
Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs' Anti-Discrimina-
tion Unit. It is designed to support activities combating discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation that contribute to any of the following of its three core objecti-
ves: 
- to improve understanding of issues related to discrimination through
analysis and evaluation 
- to develop capacity to combat and prevent discrimination through
building and strengthening inter-organisational dialogue 
- to promote values underlying the fight against discrimination through
awareness-raising activities 
In an annex to the programme called indications for the implementation of
the programme a number of areas in which it may operate are listed among
which 
(e) effective monitoring of discrimination, including multiple discriminationtion.
The work plan for 2006 foresees a study on multiple discrimination. It is
stated that 
‘the concept of multiple discrimination is not new. However, its causes and effects
need to be better understood and addressed by all stakeholders active in the fight
against discrimination. For that purpose, it is proposed to undertake a study whose
objectives would be to improve the understanding of the causes and consequences
of multiple discrimination, to raise awareness of the particular difficulties victims
of multiple discrimination face and to facilitate the expertise and experience which
can be found in this area to be utilised for the development of greater understan-
ding and cross-fertilisation of ideas. In line with Recital 4 of the Decision
establishing the Programme, the study will consider differences in the ways in
which women and men may experience discrimination on grounds of racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. The study
should also provide practical recommendations on the best way to address multiple
discrimination. In this context, a conference involving interested parties should be
foreseen as part of the study.’
29 CON(2005)44.
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The EU Commission’s 2005 report on equality between women and men
contain many remarks on the necessity to better integrate migrant women
in order to utilise the potential of those women.29
3. Concepts of Discrimination
3.1. Discrimination
In ILO law there is a comprehensive definition of discrimination. For the
purpose of the ILO Convention 111 Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 the term discrimination includes, according
to Article 1 of the Convention:
1) any distinction, 
2) exclusion or 
3) preference 






6) national extraction or 
7) social origin.
which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or
treatment in employment or occupation; 
In addition the concept of discrimination also covers such other
distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying or
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation
as may be determined by the Member concerned after consultation with
representative employers' and workers' organisations, where such exist, and
with other appropriate bodies.
Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job
based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be
discrimination.
30 SEC(2003)1213 p 7.
31 The Relations of Banks to Women Entrepreneurs. The Analysis of the Danish
Agency for Trade and Industry: Women Entrepreneurs Now and in the Future,
Published by the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry, September 2000,
available online at  http:/ /www.efs.dk/publikationer/rapporter/
bankers.uk/index-eng.html. The quotation on single mothers is from part 2.2. The
respondents in the analysis were staff in the banks and independant advisors to the
banks, eg chartered accountants.
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3.2. Direct Discrimination
Direct discrimination occurs where one person is treated less favourably, on
grounds of sex, ethnic origin, or any other of the protected criteria than
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation.
Many cases of discrimination consist in unfavourable treatment of
subgroups of women or subgroups of men. The targeted persons are not
selected exclusively on grounds of sex, ethnic origin etc but on grounds of
sex, ethnic origin etc + something more. 
Among women pregnant women, single mothers and mothers of small
children are probably those who are most exposed to discrimination. In the
Staff Working Paper30 on the directive on equal treatment in the access to
and supply of goods and services refusal to provide a mortgage to pregnant
women is mentioned as an example of discrimination that has been reported
to the Commission. One of the respondents in an analysis by the Danish
Agency for Trade and Industry stated31 stated that single mothers do not
have much chance of obtaining a loan for their enterprises. The Directive on
equal treatment in the provision of goods and services explicitly classifies
less favourable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy and maternity
as direct discrimination.
For men sex discrimination often occurs in combination with age, eg
discrimination against young men in car insurance or - mainly in countries
where state social security is based on different pension ages for men and
women - discrimination against older men who have passed the pension age
for women but not reached the pension age for their own sex. In the UK -
where the state pension age at the material time was 60 for women and 65
for men - the House of Lords has decided a case where a married man who
was 61 wanted to visit a swimming pool together with his wife who was
also 61. She was admitted free of charge because she had passed the pension
age while he was required to pay an admission fee because he had not
32 See further McCrudden, Christopher: Equality in Law between Men and Women
in the European Community, United Kingdom, Luxembourg 1994 p 15.
33 COM(2003)756 p 13.
34 The decision is available (in Danish) at www.ligenaevn.dk.
35 See for a fuller discussion on this point Lynn M. Roseberry: The Limits of
Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and European Community,
Copenhagen 1999 p 77 et seq.
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passed the pension age. This was held to be unlawful under the UK Sex
Discrimination Act 1975.32
Article 1(3) of the Directive on equal treatment in the provision of goods
and services provides that the Directive does not preclude differences which
are related to goods or services for which men and women are not in a
comparable situation because the goods or services are intended exclusively
or primarily for the members of one sex or to skills which are practised
differently for each sex. In the explanatory remarks33it is explained that
certain goods and services are specifically designed for use by members of
one sex (for example, single-sex sessions in a swimming pool).
The Danish Complaints Board for Equality has held that it was not a
violation  of the ban on sex discrimination in the Danish Equal Status Act
that an organisation (Hitzb-ut-tahrir) provided access to a public meeting
through separate entrances of equal quality for men and women.34
3.3. No defence against direct discrimination
The orthodox view in EU law is that (except for derogations from the ban
on sex discrimination) there is35 no defence that can justify direct discrimi-
nation. It can, for example, not be justified by reference to the fact that the
discriminator will incur considerable costs if he does not discriminate. 
Under Article 6 of the Framework Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC) direct  age discrimination may be justified on certain
conditions.
36 See in particular Case C-237/ 94, O'Flynn [1996] ECR 2417.
37 Case 170/84, Bilka [1986] ECR 1607.
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4. Indirect Sex Discrimination
The current definition of indirect discrimination is inspired by the case law
of the ECJ in cases involving the free movement of workers.36 Indirect
discrimination is in the current equality directives defined as situations
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons of one sex, ethnic origin, etc at a particular disadvantage compared
with persons of the other sex, etc unless that provision, criterion or practice
is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that
aim are appropriate and necessary.
Indirect discrimination may be justified by objective reasons. The starting
point is that differential treatment is an expression of discrimination unless
it can be shown that such treatment is justified in objective terms. 
The leading case is still Bilka37 where the ECJ required three conditions
to be met: 
1) There must be a  real need for the employer to apply the “su-
spect” criteria,
2) the means chosen by the employer must be necessary to achieve
this goal, and
3) the means must be appropriate, ie there must be a reasonable
proportion between end and means. 
The Bilka test is based on application of the principle of proportionality.
4.1. Harassment
Harassment (as different from sexual harassment) harassment occurs where
unwanted conduct related to the sex, ethnic origin, etc of a person is
exhibited with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and
of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive
environment. The concepts of harassment and sexual harassment are defined
separately, because they are distinct phenomena. Harassment based on sex
consists of unfavourable treatment of a person related to thir sex, though it
38 COM(2003)756 p 13.
39 See generally on gender mainstreaming and the legal sources requiring or
recommending it http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/equ_opp/
gms_en.html.
40 See the report by a group established by the Council of Europe: Gender
mainstreaming. Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good
practices. Final report of Activities of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming




need not be of a sexual nature (an example might be male employee
constantly making disparaging remarks about women customers).38
4.2. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment is unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of
a sexual nature. Sexual harassment can include: comments about the way
the person looks, indecent remarks, questions or comments about the
person's sex life, requests for sexual favours, sexual demands and any
conduct of a sexual nature which creates an intimidating, hostile or
humiliating environment. It is most often women who are subjected to
sexual harassment, but men too can be sexually harassed.
5. Gendermainstreaming
5.1. Definition(s) of the Concept of Gender Mainstreaming
The concept of gender mainstreaming is not clearly defined.39 Many have
used the metaphor of equality as something that flows in its own subsidiary
stream. With the mainstreaming strategy equality is lifted into the main
stream understood as the ordinary organisational, political and legal system.
In the Council of Europe report cited above gendermainstreaming is defined
as:40
Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and
evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated
in all polices at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in
policy-making. 
41 2002/73/EC.
42 COM(2000)335, Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-
2005) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/
equ_opp/strategy/ 2_en.html.
43 COM(96)67, Commission Communication of 21 February 1996, Incorporating
equal opportunities for women and men into all Community policies and activities.
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The gender mainstreaming strategy is mainly addressed to the drafters of
rules and policies at all levels in society, for example legislators, judges,
organisations and businesses, and calls upon them to integrate the gender
dimension into the design and implementation of all their rules and policies.
Under Article 3(2)EC there is an obligation for all Community actors
(legislator, judiciary, executive) to contribute to gender mainstreaming
European contract law when they participate in its development. At national
level, the law on gender mainstreaming varies considerably from country to
country. The amendment to the Equal Treatment Directive in 200241
extended the personal scope of the obligation to gender mainstream in
matters of employment from Community actors to the Member States. There
are broad gender mainstreaming duties for public authorities in (almost) all
areas of society in the Nordic countries. In these countries public authorities
taking part in the development of European contract law are therefore - like
the Community actors - under an obligation to contribute to gender
mainstreaming it. Private businesses, acting in other capacities than as
employers, have, as the law stands at present, practically no legally binding
duties of gender mainstreaming.
In the current action plan for gender equality42 it is - after noting that
there are still structural gender inequalities - stated:
This situation can be tackled efficiently by integrating the gender equality
objective into the policies that have a direct or indirect impact on the lives of
women and men. Women's concerns, needs and aspirations should be taken into
account and assume the same importance as men's concerns in the design and
implementation of policies. This is the gender mainstreaming approach, adopted
in 1996 by the Commission43 
In this programme the mainstreaming strategy is described as a pro-active
strategy which integrates the gender aspect into all areas covered by
Community competence and is complemented by specific actions with a
view to enhance women’s position in society. At the Commission’s
44 europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/equ_opp/gms_en.html.
45 Gender Mainstreaming. Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of
good practices, Strasbourg, May 1998, available at http://www.humanrights.coe.in-
t/ equality/
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homepage on gender mainstreaming it states that its mainstreaming method
consist of the following:44 
Dual approach = gender mainstreaming + specific actions 
Gender impact assessment & gender proofing 
Mobilising all Commission services 
Anchoring responsibility 
Training for & awareness raising among key personnel 
Monitoring, benchmarking and break down of data and statistics by sex 
Structures: 
Group of Commissioners on Equal Opportunities, 
Inter-service Group on Gender Equality, 
Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for women and men 
In the Council of Europe’s report on mainstreaming from 199845 it is
defined in the following way: 
Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and
evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated
in all polices at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in
policy-making.
It is further explained that gender mainstreaming can mean that the policy
process is reorganised so that ordinary actors know how to incorporate a
gender perspective. It can also mean that gender expertise is made a normal
requirement for policy-makers.
5.2. Methods of Gender Mainstreaming
Gender mainstreaming implies that the gender dimension is made visible
and taken into account at an early stage of the planning and design of rules
and policies before anyone has actually suffered discrimination so that sex
discrimination (direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and sexual
harassment) is prevented from happening. There is no general agreement on
how this should be done.  Different actors use different methods, often of
a socio-economic and not strictly legal nature. 
46 See further Just Progress! Applying gender mainstreaming in Sweden,
http://naring.regeringen.se/pressinfo/infomaterial/pdf/N2001_ 052.pdf 
47 Fehlberg, Belinda: Sexually transmitted debt - Surety experience and English law,
Oxford 1997.
48 See for example Debra Morris: Surety Wives in the House of Lords: Time for
Solicitors to ` Get Real'? Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 4 All
E.R. 449, Feminist Legal Studies 2003 p 57, Geary, David: Notes on Family
Guarantees in English and Scottish Law - A Comment,  European Review of
Private Law 2000 p 25 and Fehlberg, Belinda: Sexually transmitted debt - Surety
experience and English law, Oxford 1997.
49 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd0110




In Sweden the so-called 3R method has been widely discussed. It is a
review and analysis tool46 which serves as an aid in systematically
compiling facts and information about the situations of women and men in
a given operation or transaction. The three R’s stand for Representation
(how many women and how many men?), Resources (how are the resources
– money, space and time – distributed between women and men?) and
Realia (how come representation and resource distribution are divided
between the sexes in the way they are?). 
So far, the Commission has mainly pursued its gender mainstreaming
strategy by means of gender-disaggregated statistical data, bench marking,
gender impact assessments and socio-economic gender equality indicators.
As an example from socio-legal contract law research which highlights
the social and economic gender-relatedness of the law of surety contracts
Belinda Fehlberg’s study on surety wives may be mentioned.47
5.2.2. Case law and academic legal literature
In my view traditional legal sources such as case law and academic
literature will often be useful tools in making the gender dimension of a
particular area of law visible. The issue of surety wives and their legal
position has for example - in addition to the abovementioned socio-legal
study - also been addressed in traditional legal literature48 and case law49 on
a number of occasions during recent years. The proposal for a Directive on
credit for consumers from 200250 which will harmonise the law of consumer
surety contracts does, however, not integrate the gender aspect.
51 See further Razavi, Shahra og Carol Miller: Gender Mainstreaming. A Study on
the Efforts by the UNDP, the World Bank and the ILO to Institutionalize Gender
Issues, Occasional Paper Series, Fourth World Conference on Women, OP 4,
UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), August
1995 and Programme of Action for the mainstreaming of gender equality in
Community Development Co-operation COM(2001)295.
52 See Council Resolution of 20 May 1999 on women and science, OJ 1999 C 201.
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 2836/98 of 22 December 1998 on integrating of
gender issues in development cooperation. This Regulation will expire in
December 2003. In the Commission’s work programme for 2003, COM (2002)590,
it is announced that it will be revised taking into account the main elements of the
Programme of Action for the mainstreaming of gender equality in Community
Development Co-operation COM(2001)295.
54 Recital 4 of Directive 2002/73/EC.
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5.3. Fragmentary duty to gender mainstream European law
The mainstreaming principle was first applied in the context of international
development aid where it has been used since the mid 1980's.51 
5.3.1. The EU duty of gender mainstreaming
The EU has practised the gender mainstreaming strategy by means of soft
law since the early 1990's in the field of employment and occupation and
increasingly also in other fields such as development aid and research.52 The
first binding EU measure on gender mainstreaming was the Regulation on
gender mainstreaming activities in the area of development cooperation.53
The Community’s mainstreaming obligation was (as from 1 May 1999)
reinforced by the Amsterdam Treaty which elevated it in the hierarchy of
the sources of law to Treaty level and extended its material scope to all
areas covered by Community competence. 
Under Article 2 EC, the Community shall have as its task to promote
equality between men and women. Article 3(2) EC states that in the context
of the activities referred to in Article 3(1) EC carried on for the purposes set
out in Article 2 EC: ‘the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and
to promote equality, between men and women.’ In the Equal Treatment
Directive as amended in 200254 these Treaty provisions are summarised as
follows (emphasis added): 
Equality between women and men is a fundamental principle, under Article 2 and
Article 3(2) of the EC Treaty and the case-law of the Court of Justice. These Treaty
55 Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory v Deutschland [2003] ECR I-2479, point 102-3.
56 In Dory the old Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC.
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provisions proclaim equality between women and men as a "task" and an "aim" of
the Community and impose a positive obligation to "promote" it in all its activities.
Article II-23 of the draft Constitution for the EU provides that equality
between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employ-
ment, work and pay. Article III-3 puts an obligation upon the Member
States to integrate the aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation when
defining and implementing all the policies and activities referred to in Part
III of the draft Constitution.
5.3.2. The ECJ
In Dory55 AG Stix-Hackl argued that there is an obligation for the ECJ to
interpret anti-discriminatory Community measures56 in light of the
mainstreaming provision in Article 3(2)EC, see the following:
.. in my opinion, in interpreting the scope of Directive 76/207, Article 3(2) EC
must now also be taken into account. That provision of primary law was not yet in
force at the time when the directive was drawn up. However, the Community is
now expressly required by that provision actively to promote equality between men
and women. 
103 As regards the scope of Article 3(2) EC, it may be seen that it applies to the
Community's ` activities referred to' in Article 3(1) EC. Community law concerning
the equal treatment of men and women in access to employment may be regarded
as `social policy' within the meaning of Article 3(1)(j) EC. (48) As regards the
`activities referred to', Article 3(2) EC imposes an obligation on ` the Community'.
That presumably includes the Court when dealing, in connection with a reference
for a preliminary ruling, with the interpretation of secondary law in the field of
social policy.  
That principle will apply equally or a fortiori to the coming Directive on
equal treatment in the provision of goods and services. The coming
Directive will be adopted at a time when the gender mainstreaming strategy
is well-known and at least some of the participants in the legislative process
are very conscious about the mainstreaming perspective in the directive. 
57 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR
1891.
58 Case 79/83 Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH [1984] ECR 1921.
59 Case 237/82, Jongeneel Kaas [1984] ECR 483.
60 Case C-224/01, Köbler [2003] ECR I-00000 (nyr).
61 COM(2003)756 p 14.
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5.3.3. National courts’ duty of gender mainstreaming under Community law
In 1984, in Colson,57 and Harz,58 the ECJ  laid down an obligation for all the
authorities of the Member States, and especially the courts, to interpret
national law in conformity with Community law. AG Mancini, in Jongeneel
Kaas described the national courts also as Community courts, see the
following:59
The general principles ... of Community law ... may be relied upon by individuals
before the national court which, as is well known, is also a Community court. 
AG Léger in Köbler60 similarly stated that  the European Communities have
been developed and consolidated essentially through law. Since the national
courts have the function of applying the law, including Community law,
they inevitably constitute an essential cog in the Community legal order.
Because all national courts are, under EU law, also Community courts the
national courts presumably have mainstreaming obligations similar to those
of the ECJ.
6. Positive action
As examples of relevant positive action measures in respect of contracts for
the provision of goods and services, the Commission, in the proposal for a
Directive on equal treatment in this area, mentions61 women’s difficulties
in getting access to commercial loans and venture capital. While the
application of the principle of equal treatment is likely to help with this
situation, it is, in the view of the Commission, unlikely to be sufficient on
its own to overcome the accumulated disadvantage faced by women. One
response to this situation has been the establishment of specific loans for
women entrepreneurs, at special rates or conditions, and the provision of
extra business support and advice services for women entrepreneurs. Special
services for women entrepreneurs exist in a number of Member States and
62 Article 141(4) EC will, once the Constitutional Treaty has come into force, be
replaced by Article III-108(4) of the Constituional Treaty which is identical with
Article 141(4) EC. 
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in at least one, special banks or lending facilities exist specifically for this
purpose. The Commission believes that the Directive should not prohibit the
possibility for such measures in Member States and therefore that it is
necessary to include an option for Member States to provide for positive
action.
6.1. Division of power between the EU and the Member States
Positive action is an option for the Member States. There is never a duty
under EU law for the Member States to take positive action or to allow or
impose a duty upon their businesses/citizens to take positive action. 
To some extent EU law prohibits positive action, namely proclaimed
positive action measures that do not pursue a genuine equality purpose or
apply excessive means to achieve its (lawful) purpose. If measures are
within the sphere of lawful positive action under EU law it is for the
Member States, in accordance with their political choices, to decide whether
or not to allow or prohibit positive action in the individual country.
6.2. EU law
6.2.1. Statutory positive action provisions in EU law
Article 141(4) EC which applies to working life provides:
4. With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State
from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order
to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
Article II-23 of the draft Constitutional Treaty which applies in all areas of
law, also outside of employment62 provides: 
Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including
employment, work and pay. 
The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of
measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.
63 See for the same view Fredman, Sandra: Double Trouble. Multiple Discrimination





66 As at 1.5.1999 when the Amsterdam Treaty came into force.
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All the above mentioned equality directives contain provisions allowing for
positive action in respect of each specific criteria protected by the directive.
This probably also means that it is ion accordance with EU law to take
positive action to support subgroups suffering from multiple
discrimination.63
6.2.2. The case law of the ECJ
Article 2(4) of the (old) Equal Treatment Directive 197664 provides:
4. This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)
Article 141(4) EC as worded by the Amsterdam Treaty provides
4. With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State
from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order
to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
The EC Treaty overrides the Equal Treatment Directive as lex superior. As
the Commission stated in its proposal for an amendment of the Equal
Treatment Directive,65 Article 2(4) of the Directive has become redundant.66
The Commission therefore proposed that it should be deleted. 
67 Case 312/86, Commission v France [1988] ECR 6315.
68 Case C-450/93, Kalanke [1995] ECR I-3051.
69 Case C-409/95, Marschall [1997] ECR I-6363.
70 Case C-158/97, Badeck [2000] ECR  I-1875 .
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Article 2(4) of the directive was interpreted by the ECJ in the Commis-
sion v France67 case, the Kalanke68 case and the Marschall69 case and more
recently in the Badek 70case. The commission summarised that case law in
the following way in the proposal for amendment of the Equal Treatment
Directive:
– the possibility to adopt positive action measures is to be regarded as an
exception to the principle of equal treatment;
– the exception is specifically and exclusively designed to allow for
measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact
intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may
exist in the realit y of social life;
– automatic priority to women, as regards access to employment or
promotion, in sectors where they are under-represented cannot be
justified;
– conversely, such a priority is justified, if it is not automatic and if the
national measure in question guarantees equally qualified male candida-
tes that their situation will be the subject of an objective assessment
which take into account all criteria specific to the candidates, whatever
their gender.
The Commission v France case of 1986 is so far the only infringement
procedure concerning positive action that has been brought before the ECJ.
France had introduced a provision in the Code de Travail prescribing that
any term reserving the benefit of any measure to one or more employees on
grounds of sex included in any collective labour agreement or employment
contract shall be void, except where such a clause was intended to
implement provisions relating to pregnancy, nursing or pre-natal and post-
natal rest. However, another provision prescribed that the above-mentioned
provision of the Code de Travail did not prohibit the application of usages,
terms of contracts of employment or collective agreements in force on the
date on which the law was promulgated granting special rights to women.
The Commission submitted – and was not contradicted by the French
71 Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson [2000] ECR I-5539.
72 Case C-79/99 Schnorbus [2000] ECR I-10997.
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Government – that special rights for women included in collective
agreements related in particular to: the extension of maternity leave; the
shortening of working hours, for example for women over 59 years of age;
the advancement of the retirement age; the obtaining of leave when a child
was ill; the granting of additional days of annual leave in respect of each
child: the granting of one day’s leave at the beginning of the school year:
the granting of time off work on Mother’s Day; daily breaks for women
working on keyboard equipment or employed as typists or switchboard
operators; the granting of extra points for pension rights in respect of the
second and subsequent children; and the payment of an allowance to
mothers who had to meet the costs of nurseries or childminders. 
The Commission accepted that some of those special rights may fall
within the scope of the derogations in the Equal Treatment Directive. It
submitted, however, that the French legislation, by its generality, made it
possible to preserve for an indefinite period measures discriminating as
between men and women contrary to the directive. The ECJ accepted the
Commission’s views on these points and France was ordered to amend its
legislation. 
The objection to the provision at issue was mainly that it was general and
applied for an indefinite period. Thus, France had gone beyond what was
necessary and had thus violated the principle of proportionality. 
The interpretation of the new provision in Article 141(4) was addressed
by the ECJ Abrahamsson71 case. The ECJ confirmed that positive action
aiming to promote women in those sectors of the public service where they
are under-represented has to be considered as compatible with EU law. It
clarified the conditions in which positive action can be applied and stated
that the male and the female candidates must have equal or almost equal
merits. The automatic and absolute preference of a candidate of the
underrepresented sex who had a sufficient but lower qualification was by
contrast incompatible with the principle of equal treatment. 
Schnorbus72 concerned the automatic preference accorded to male
candidates who had completed compulsory military or civilian service for
(all) positions as legal adviser in Land Hessen, Germany. The German court
asked the ECJ: 
“4. Is the fact that the rule automatically results in the preferential admission of
men to training without a decision on the matter being subject to an assessment of
73 Case C-476/99, Lommers [2002] ECR I-2891.
74 In paragraph 40.
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the individual circumstances or of other relevant factors meriting consideration in
the interests of the remaining applicants sufficient to preclude justification of the
rule under Article 2 (4) of Directive 76/207/EEC because it is to that extent more
than a measure to promote equal opportunity?” 
The ECJ established that a measure that accords preference to persons who
have completed compulsory military or civilian service constitutes indirect
discrimination in favour of men. The ECJ found however that the provision
at issue, which took account of the delay experienced in the progress of their
education by applicants who had been required to do military or civilian
service, was objective in nature and prompted solely by the desire to
counterbalance to some extent the effects of that delay. The automatic
preference accorded to men was therefore not regarded as contrary to the
Equal Treatment Directive. Judged on the basis of the principle of
proportionality, the preference accorded to men did not go beyond what was
necessary to compensate for the disadvantages entailed by compulsory
military or community service. 
Beyond the preference accorded to men who had completed compulsory
military or civilian service, there was a possibility of taking particular
hardship into account. This must be viewed in connection with the fact that
the measure concerned all the positions as legal adviser in Land Hessen. 
The Lommers case73 concerned a Netherlands scheme under which the
Minister for Agriculture made available subsidized nursery places to female
officials. Women were given priority with regard to all the nursery places
made available by the employer save in the event of an emergency, to be
determined by the Minister. Thus, men could only obtain a nursery place
from the employer in question if there was an emergency. In this case the
ECJ made explicit reference to the principle of proportionality and
established74 that in cases involving preliminary questions it is, in principle,
the task of the national court to ensure that the principle of proportionality
is duly observed. However, the ECJ may provide the national court with an
interpretation of Community law on all such points as may enable the court
to assess the compatibility of a national measure with Community law. The
Netherlands scheme was regarded as compatible with the Equal Treatment
Directive. 
To sum up, the ECJ disallowed positive action measures in the Commis-
sion v France, Kalanke and Abrahamsson, and approved such measures in
75 See Tridimas, Takis: The general principles of EC law, Oxford 1999, Van Gerven,
Walter: Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, Common Market Law Review 2000
p 501 and O'Keeffe, David and Bavasso, Antonio (eds): Judicial Review in
European Union Law, The Hague 2000.
76 Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECR 1651.
77 See, in particular, Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76
Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 13; Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 501,
paragraph 25; Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12; Case
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Marschall, Badeck, Schnorbus and Lommers. Positive action is unlawful if
the measure is very general and applies for an indefinite period, or if the
method selected is disproportionate to the aim pursued (Abrahamsson).
There is considerable latitude for applying gender quota arrangements when
appointing people to training places/positions (Badeck). Although priority
may be given automatically to one sex as regards access to employment and
working conditions, eg nursery places (Schnorbus and Lommers), the
opposite sex must not be excluded from all possibilities of obtaining a
position or a working condition of the kind concerned (Kalanke, Marschall,
Lommers).
The general principle underlying ECJ case-law on positive action is that
the principle of proportionality shall be observed. This means that any
special measures that favour one sex shall serve a lawful purpose, they shall
be appropriate and necessary for the attainment of this goal, and they must
not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. 
7. Enforcement and Monitoring of EU Equality Law
Judicial protection both at European and national level has been a much
debated issue during recent years.75 The ECJ stated in Johnston76 that all
persons have the right to obtain an effective remedy in a competent court
against measures which they consider to be contrary to the principle of
equal treatment for men and women.
7.1. National Autonomy to Choose Remedies and Procedures
According to settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules governing the
matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate
the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction, to lay down the detailed
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals
derive from Community law, and to choose the relevant remedies.77 
C-208/90 Emmott [1991] ECR I-4269, paragraph 16; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck
[1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van
Schijndel and Van Veen [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 17; Case C-261/95
Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, paragraph 27; Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum
[1997] ECR I-4085, paragraph 46; Case C-188/95 Fantask and Others [1997] ECR
I-6783, paragraph 47; Case C-326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-7835, paragraph 18,
Case C-78/98 Preston [2000] ECR ECR I-3201 paragraph 31.
78 Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2979.
79 Article II-47 of the draft Constitutional Treaty which incorporates the
corresponding provision in the Charter of Fundamental rights reads:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with
the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources insofar as
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.
80 Article 13 ECHR reads: Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.
81 Article 6 ECHR reads: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
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The choice of penalties thus remains within the discretion of the Member
States but their choice must be exercised with respect for the general EU
law principles of equivalence, effectiveness and  proportionality. In 1989,
in Commission v Greece78 the ECJ laid down some minimum Community
conditions to be applied to the national rules. First, conditions attached to
the national rules must not be less favourable than those attached to similar
national actions. Second, the national rules must not be framed so as to
render virtually impossible the exercise of Community rights. In any event,
the remedy must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Article II-4779 of the draft Constitutional Treaty provides for a right to an
effective remedy and to a fair trial before a tribunal (tribunal in French,
Gericht in German). The first paragraph of Article II-47 is based on Article
13 ECHR80 The second paragraph of Article II-47 corresponds to Article
6(1) ECHR but goes a little further in that it also covers public law, see
below in part 7.81 The ECJ has referred to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR as
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly....
82 93/13/EEC.
83 85/577/EEC. 
84 See eg the UK SDA Section 66(2) SDA.
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expressions of underlying general principles of Community law in Johnston
and a number of subsequent judgments. Article II-47 applies to the
institutions of the EU and of the Member States when they are acting in the
sphere of EU law. 
Under the acquis communautaire Member States are bound by the
fundamental rights including for example the fundamental right not to be
discriminated against on grounds of sex when they act within the sphere of
Community law as for example within the scope of one of the contract law
directives. It follows, for example, that the Directive on unfair terms in
consumer contracts82 makes sex discriminatory contractual terms unlawful
and harassment and sexual harassment in the provision of goods and
services are unlawful within the field of the Directive on doorstep selling.83
A person who can only rely on the fundamental right not to be discriminated
against on grounds of sex is, however, in a fairly weak position if she wants
to enforce her right.  If a door-step seller for example harasses a customer
in her home the Directive on doorstep selling provides for no specific
remedy but the national courts must follow the general principles of
Community law and find an effective remedy. The appropriate remedy
depends on the circumstances. Remedies may include: a declaration of
rights, damages, an injunction ordering a party not to do something or to do
something.84 
In addition to the above general principles, which apply in all matters
governed by Community law, Member States will be required to comply
with the specific requirements provided for in Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the
Directive on equal treatment in the access to and supply of goods and
services when (and if) that Directive is adopted. Those Articles lay down
provisions on judicial and administrative procedures, compensation or
reparation, legal standing, dialogue with organisations, time limits, burden
of proof and specific equality bodies to control that the principle of equal
treatment is observed.
85 Case 14/83, Colson [1984] ECR 1891.
86 Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043 and Case
33/76 Rewe-Zentral Finanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976]
ECR 1989.
87 See, for example, Case C-326/88 Anklagemyndigheden v Hansen & Søn I/S [1990]
ECR I-2911.
88 Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097.
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7.1.1. The principle of proportionality
In Colson,85 AG Rozes argued that the deterrent effect of the sanctions must
be assessed on the basis of the principle of proportionality and compared to
sanctions imposed in national law to other offences of the same gravity. The
ECJ held that it is impossible to establish real equality of opportunity
without an appropriate system of sanctions. Although full implementation
of the employment directives does not require any specific form of sanction,
it does entail that that sanction be such as to guarantee real and effective
judicial protection. Moreover it must also have a real deterrent effect on the
employer.  
7.1.2. The principle of effectiveness
The classic formulation of the principle of effectiveness was introduced in
Comet.86 Where Community legislation does not specifically provide any
penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws,
regulations and administrative provisions, Article 10 EC requires the
Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application
and effectiveness of Community law. For that purpose, whilst the choice of
penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure that infringe-
ments of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural
and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements
of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event,
make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive.87 
In Heylens88 the ECJ found that  there must be a remedy of a judicial
nature against the refusal of the French Minister to recognize a diploma. The
Court held that since free access to employment is a fundamental right
which the EC Treaty confers individually on each worker in the community,
the existence of a remedy of a judicial nature against any decision of a
national authority refusing the benefit of that right is essential in order to
secure for the individual effective protection for his right. As the ECJ held
in  Johnston that requirement reflects a general principle of community law
89 Case 14/83, Colson [1984] ECR 1891.
90 Case C-382/92, Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 and Case C-
383/92, Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2479.
91 Case 14/83, Colson [1984] ECR 1891.
92 76/207/EEC.
31
which underlies the constitutional traditions Common to the member states
and has been enshrined in articles 6 and 13 ECHR. 
In Colson,89 the ECJ struck down a German rule providing for reliance
damages as insufficient to deter employers from discriminating on grounds
of sex, see for more details below on reliance damages.
7.1.3. The principles of equivalence
The infringement actions90 against UK for failure to implement the original
collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings directives addressed
the problem that employee representation in undertakings within the UK
was based on voluntary recognition of trade unions by employers and for
that reason there was no remedy against an employer who did not recognize
a trade union. The ECJ considered this state of law incompatible with the
duty of the Member States to contribute to the effective application of
Community law. In this case the UK treatment of information and consulta-
tion of employees in matters covered by Community law was the same as
the treatment of information and consultation of employees in national
matters not covered by Community law, namely a totally voluntary solution.
The principle of equivalence was thus fulfilled but the principle of
effectiveness was violated.
7.2. Specific Performance
If a party does not perform a contract although performance is possible, the
question arises whether the other party may claim performance in natura.
In Colson91 the Arbeitsgericht Hamm raised the question as to whether
the Equal treatment Directive92 requires discrimination on grounds of sex in
the matter of access to employment to be penalized by an obligation,
imposed on an employer who is guilty of discrimination, to conclude a
contract of employment with the candidate who was the victim of discrimi-
nation. The ECJ held that the Equal treatment Directive does not require
discrimination on grounds of sex regarding access to employment to be
93 See Bussani, Mauro (ed): Pure Economic Loss in Europe, Cambridge 2003 is a
contribution to the common core project. 
94 2002/73/EC.
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made the subject of a sanction by way of an obligation imposed upon the
employer who is the author of the discrimination to conclude a contract of
employment with the candidate discriminated against. 
In respect of specific performance employment contracts are special
because of the personal character of the contract. In discrimination cases
outside of the labour market the general rules in the nationalsystem which
is the applicable law of the contract must apply. Under common law, the
main rule is that there is no claim for specific performance. However,
specific performance is granted if the normal sanction of damages would be
inadequate. In civil law countries, the main rule is the opposite, namely that
there is a claim for specific performance.
7.3. Compensation or Reparation
Damages/compensation is a typical remedy in national law.93 In discrimina-
tion cases in the employment field a number of questions have been raised
as to which elements must be included.
Article 7(2) in the the directive on equal treatment in the provision of goods
and services provides:
2. Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures
as are necessary to ensure real and effective compensation or reparation, as the
Member States so determine, for the loss and damage sustained by a person injured
as a result of discrimination within the meaning of this Directive, in a way which
is dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered. Such compensation or
reparation shall not be restricted by the fixing of a prior upper limit.
It is in broad terms similar to Article 6(2) of the amended equal treatment
directive94 which provides:
2. Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures
as are necessary to ensure real and effective compensation or reparation as the
Member States so determine for the loss and damage sustained by a person injured
as a result of discrimination contrary to Article 3, in a way which is dissuasive and
proportionate to the damage suffered; such compensation or reparation may not be
restricted by the fixing of a prior upper limit, except in cases where the employer
can prove that the only damage suffered by an applicant as a result of discrimina-
95 Case C-177/88, Dekker [1990] ECR I-3941.
96 Case C-180/95, Draempaehl [1997] ECR  I-2195.
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tion within the meaning of this Directive is the refusal to take his/her job
application into consideration.
To the difference of the directive on goods and services the amended equal
treatment directive explicitly states that the compensation or reparation that
is ensured must be dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered.
That applies also in respect of the directive on goods and services since it
followsfrom the general principles of EU law. 
7.3.1. Requirement of fault
In Dekker95 the Hoge Raad (the Dutch Supreme Court) referred the question
whether it is compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive that, if the
infringement of the principle of equal treatment is established, for the award
of the claim it is also necessary that the employer has committed a fault. 
The ECJ held that the refusal to engage a pregnant woman on the ground
that she is pregnant constitutes a form of direct discrimination on the
grounds of sex. Furthermore, proof of such discrimination is not contingent
upon a comparison with the treatment of a male employee. The ECJ stressed
that the primary liability for a breach of the Equal Treatment Directive is
upon the employer and that he or she cannot rely upon exemptions,
exclusions or justifications available in national law to justify discrimination
against a pregnant employee. 
In Draempaehl,96 the ECJ again discussed the question as to whether a
requirement of fault in national law is consistent with EU law. The
following preliminary question was referred to it:
1. Does a statutory provision which makes it a condition for an award of
compensation for discrimination on grounds of sex in the making of an appoint-
ment that there must be fault on the part of the employer conflict with Articles 2(1)
and 3(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementa-
tion of the principle of equal treatment of men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions?
The Court referred to its judgment in Dekker and concluded that the equal
treatment directive precludes provisions of domestic law which, like
§611a(1) and (2) of the BGB, make reparation of damage suffered as a
result of discrimination on grounds of sex in the making of an appointment
subject to the requirement of fault. That conclusion could not be affected by
97 See further section 66 SDA.
98 Case 14/83, Colson [1984] ECR 1891.
34
the German Government's argument that proof of such fault is easy to
adduce since, in German law, fault entails liability for deliberate or
negligent acts.
The above rule on no-fault liability will probably correspondingly to sex
discrimination outside of employment. In existing national law there are,
however, examples of stricter liability rules in the employment field than
outside of employment. The Norwegian Gender Equality Act Section 17 on
liability for damages thus provides:
Any job seeker or employee who has been subjected to differential treatment in
contravention of sections 3 to 6 shall be entitled to compensation regardless of the
fault of the employer. Compensation shall be fixed at the amount that is reasonable,
having regard to the financial loss, the situation of the employer and the employee
or job seeker and all other circumstances.
In all other respects, the general rules regarding liability for damages in the event
of wilful or negligent contravention of the provisions of this Act shall apply.
Similarly, in the UK damages cannot be awarded for indirect discrimination
in the provision of goods and services under the UK SDA97 if the respondent
proves that the requirement or condition in question was not applied with
the intention of treating the claimant unfavourably on the ground of his or
her sex. The requirement of intention as a precondition for damages makes
the UK ban against indirect discrimination in matters of goods and services
weak compared to the standard provided for in employment and in the
Directive on equal treatment in contracts for the provision of goods and
services.
7.3.2. Reliance damages
Reliance damages restore the injured party to his or her original pre-
contractual position. Job-seekers whose right are violated, eg by discrimina-
tion, will often have incurred  only limited economic loss such as the costs
of stamps and an envelope. A duty to pay compensation for such costs will
not be effective in deterring employers from discriminating. 
In Colson98 the ECJ ruled in a case where rejected applicants under
German law received reimbursement of their application costs and nothing
more. The Commission considered that although the directive is intended
to leave to Member States the choice and the determination of the sanctions,
the transposition of the directive must nevertheless produce effective results.
99 Case C-271/91, Marshall (No 2) [1993] ECR I-4367.
100 Case C-180/95, Draempaehl [1997] ECR  I-2195.
101 Case 152/84, Marshall (1) [1986] ECR 723.
102 76/207/EEC.
103 Case C-271/91, Marshall (No 2) [1993] ECR I-4367.
104 The then competent English tribunal, today it would be an employment tribunal.
35
The principle of the effective transposition of the directive requires that the
sanctions must be of such a nature as to constitute appropriate compensation
for the candidate discriminated against and for the employer a means of
pressure which it would be unwise to disregard and which would prompt
him to respect the principle of equal treatment. A national measure which
provides for compensation only for losses actually incurred through reliance
on an expectation (Vertrauensschaden) is not sufficient to ensure complian-
ce with that principle.
The ECJ held that national provisions limiting the right to compensation
of persons who have been discriminated against as regards access to
employment to a purely nominal amount, such as, for example, the
reimbursement of expenses incurred by them in submitting their application,
would not satisfy the requirements of an effective transposition of the Equal
Treatment Directive.
7.3.3. Upper limit for compensation and exclusion of interest
The question as to whether the Member States can put a ceiling on
compensation was at issue both in Marshall99 and in Draempaehl.100
Miss Marshall was dismissed in 1980 at the age of 62, in a situation in
which a man would have been dismissed at the age of 65. In Marshall (1),101
the ECJ ruled that this was in conflict with article 5 of the Directive on
Equal Treatment,102 which created direct effects vis-à-vis a public employer.
Marshall then made a claim for compensation. 
The dispute in Marshall (2)103 arose because the Industrial Tribunal,104 to
which the Court of Appeal remitted the case to consider the question of
compensation, assessed Miss Marshall' s financial loss at 18.405£, including
7.710 £ by way of interest, and awarded her compensation of 19.405 £,
including a sum of 1.000£ compensation for injury to feelings. According
to the then relevant provision of the SDA, where an Industrial Tribunal
found that a complaint of unlawful sex discrimination in relation to
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employment was well founded, it should, if it considered it just and
equitable to do so, make an order requiring the respondent to pay to the
complainant compensation of an amount corresponding to any damages he
could have been ordered by a County Court to pay to the complainant.
Under the then section 65(2) of the SDA, however, the amount of compen-
sation awarded could not exceed a specified limit, which at the relevant time
was 6.250 £. At that time an Industrial Tribunal had no power - or at least
the relevant provisions were ambiguous as to whether it had such a power -
to award interest on compensation for an act of unlawful sex discrimination
in relation to employment. The House of Lords referred a number of
questions to the ECJ concerning the extent to which these restrictions
complied with Article 6 of the Directive on Equal Treatment:
1. Where the national legislation of a Member State provides for the payment of
compensation as one remedy available by judicial process to a person who has
been subjected to unlawful discrimination of a kind prohibited by Council
Directive 76/207/EEC is the Member State guilty of a failure to implement Article
6 of the Directive by reason of the imposition by the legislation of an upper limit
on the amount of compensation recoverable by such a person?
2. Where the national legislation provides for the payment of compensation is it
essential to the due implementation of Article 6 of the Directive that the compensa-
tion to be awarded:
a) should not be less than the amount of the loss found to have been sustained by
reason of the unlawful discrimination
b) should include an award of interest on the principal amount of the loss so found
from the date of the unlawful discrimination to the date when the compensation is
paid?
The ECJ understood the questions put by the House of Lords as asking, in
essence, whether it follows from the Directive on Equal Treatment that a
victim of sex discrimination is entitled to (emphasis added) full reparation
for the loss and damage he or she had sustained. 
The Court held that although the Equal Treatment Directive leaves
Member States, when providing a remedy for breach of the prohibition
against discrimination, free to choose between the different solutions
suitable for achieving the objective of the directive, it nevertheless entails
that if financial compensation is to be awarded where there has been
discrimination such compensation must be adequate, in that it must enable
the loss and damage actually sustained as a result of the discriminatory
dismissal to be made good in full in accordance with the applicable national
rules. Accordingly, the interpretation of Article 6 of the Equal Treatment
Directive must be that reparation of the loss and damage sustained by a
person injured as a result of discriminatory dismissal may not be limited to
105 Case C-180/95, Draempaehl [1997] ECR  I-2195.
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an upper limit fixed a priori or by excluding an award of interest to
compensate for the loss sustained by the recipient of the compensation as
a result of the effluxion of time until the capital sum awarded is actually
paid. The response of the ECJ was that Article 6 should be interpreted such
that damages for a loss, suffered by a person in the context of a dismissal
which is discriminatory on the basis of gender, may not be restricted to a
maximum amount determined a priori, and that interest must be awarded as
compensation for a justified loss, in respect of the time elapsed until the
damages are actually paid. 
In Draempaehl105 the national court referred questions for a preliminary
ruling on whether it is in conflict with the Equal Treatment Directive that
a statutory provision prescribes an upper limit of three months' salary as
compensation for discrimination on grounds of sex in the making of an
appointment - in contrast to other provisions of domestic civil and labour
law - for applicants of either sex who have been discriminated against in the
procedure, but who would not have obtained the position to be filled even
in the event of non-discriminatory selection by reason of the superior
qualifications of the applicant appointed.
The national court also asked if a statutory provision is in conflict with
the Equal Treatment Directive if it prescribes an upper limit of three month's
salary as compensation for discrimination on grounds of sex in the making
of an appointment - in contrast to other domestic provisions of civil and
labour law - for applicants of either sex who, in the event of
non-discriminatory selection, would have obtained the position to be filled.
Finally it asked whether it is in conflict with the Equal treatment Directive
if  a statutory provision, where compensation is claimed by several parties
for discrimination on grounds of sex in the making of an appointment,
prescribes an upper limit of the aggregate of six months' salary for all
persons who have suffered discrimination - in contrast to other provisions
of domestic civil and labour law 
The ECJ held that the Equal Treatment Directive does not preclude
provisions of domestic law which prescribe an upper limit of three months'
salary for the amount of compensation which may be claimed by an
applicant where the employer can prove that, because the applicant engaged
had superior qualification, the unsuccessful applicant would not have
obtained the vacant position, even if there had been no discrimination in the
selection process. In contrast, the Directive precludes provisions of domestic
law which, unlike other provisions of domestic civil and labour law,
106  Case C168/00, Leitner [2002] I-2631.
107 90/314/EEC.
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prescribe an upper limit of three months' salary for the amount of compensa-
tion which may be claimed by an applicant discriminated against on grounds
of sex in the making of an appointment where that applicant would have
obtained the vacant position if the selection process had been carried out
without discrimination.
Finally the ECJ held that the Directive precludes provisions of domestic
law which, unlike other provisions of domestic civil and labour law, impose
a ceiling of six months' salary on the aggregate amount of compensation
which, where several applicants claim compensation, may be claimed by
applicants who have been discriminated against on grounds of their sex in
the making of an appointment.
7.3.4. Compensation for non-material damage
In Leitner,106 the ECJ was asked whether Article 5 of the package travel
directive107 is to be interpreted as meaning that compensation is in principle
payable in respect of claims for compensation for non-material damage. 
The Commission argued that the term damage is used in the Directive
without any restriction, and that, specifically in the field of holiday travel,
damage other than physical injury is a frequent occurrence. It then noted
that liability for non-material damage is recognised in most Member States,
over and above compensation for physical pain and suffering traditionally
provided for in all legal systems, although the extent of that liability and the
conditions under which it is incurred vary in detail. The Commission
maintained that it is not possible to interpret restrictively the general concept
of damage used in the Directive and to exclude from it as a matter of
principle non-material damage.
The ECJ noted that it was not in dispute that, in the field of package
holidays, the existence in some Member States but not in others of an
obligation to provide compensation for non-material damage would cause
significant distortions of competition, given that, as the Commission has
pointed out, non-material damage is a frequent occurrence in that field.
Furthermore, the Directive, and in particular Article 5 thereof, is designed
to offer protection to consumers and, in connection with tourist holidays,
compensation for non-material damage arising from the loss of enjoyment
of the holiday is of particular importance to consumers. It is in light of those
considerations that Article 5 of the Directive is to be interpreted. 
108 See from national law section 66 (4) of the UK SDA which provides for
compensation for injury to feelings.
109 Case 14/83, Colson [1984] ECR 1891.
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Although the first subparagraph of Article 5(2) merely refers in a general
manner to the concept of damage, the fact that the fourth subparagraph of
Article 5(2) provides that Member States may, in the matter of damage other
than personal injury, allow compensation to be limited under the contract
provided that such limitation is not unreasonable, means that the Directive
implicitly recognises the existence of a right to compensation for damage
other than personal injury, including non-material damage. The answer to
the question referred was therefore that Article 5 of the Directive is to be
interpreted as conferring, in principle, on consumers a right to compensation
for non-material damage resulting from the non-performance or improper
performance of the services constituting a package holiday. 
With regard to sex discrimination in the provision of goods and services
national law also provide for compensation for non-material damage to a
varying degree.108 The distortion of competition argument is probably
weaker in this field than with regard to package holidays. The principle of
effectiveness will often require compensation to be paid for non-material
damage because there will typically be no physical injury and the economic
loss sustained may be so small that compensation only for economic loss
will not be sufficient for the sanction to act as a deterrent, see above on the
Colson case.109
7.4. Courts 
7.4.1. A fair and public hearing
Article II-47(2) of the draft Constitutional Treaty which incorporates the
corresponding provision in Article 6 ECHR in the Charter of Fundamental
rights reads:
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
7.4.2. Civil, criminal and public law
Article 6 ECHR has a more limited scope. It stipulates that in the determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing. Compared to that Article
110 Article 13 ECHR reads: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
111 Case 294/83, Les Verts [1988] ECR 1339.
112 Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9.10.1979 in case no 6289/73, available at
www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm.
113 Article 52(3) of the Charter provides: ‘Insofar as this Charter contains rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be
the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’
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II-47(2) goes a little further.110 In EU law, the right to a fair hearing is not
confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations and criminal
proceedings but applies  equally to public law. That is in the explanatory
remarks seen as a consequence of the fact that the EU is a community based
on the rule of law as stated by the ECJ in Les Verts.111 Litigation over such
clauses will be protected by the draft Constitution irrespective of whether
the problem is classified as a public law or a private law issue.
In all respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the
ECHR apply in a similar way to the EU. 
7.4.3. Legal aid
Article II-47(3) of the draft Constitutional Treaty reads:
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources insofar as
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.
This provision is  in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR according
to which provision should be made for legal aid where the absence of such
aid would make it impossible to ensure an effective remedy.112 In the
explanatory remarks to the Charter of fundamental Rights this case law is
mentioned as an example of the endeavors of the EU to live up to the
standard established by ECHR.113
114 Case 61/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1982] ECR 2601.
115 75/117/EEC.
116 Malleson , Kate: Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won't
Do, Feminist Legal Studies 2003 p 1.
117 EC/44/2001.
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7.4.4. An independent and impartial court
It is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the
courts and tribunals having jurisdiction. They can, however, not choose that
no court or tribunal is competent. In Commission v UK114 concerning the
implementation of the Equal Pay Directive,115 the ECJ thus held that each
Member State must endow an authority with the requisite jurisdiction to
decide whether work has the same value as other work
7.4.4.1. Gender composition of the courts and similar bodies
Malleson116 argues that equal participation of men and women in the justice
system is an inherent and essential feature of a democracy without which
the judiciary will lose public confidence. 
In the Danish gender equality Acts setting up the complaint board for
equality  there is a gender parity. The board consists of three members
among whihc both sexes must be represented. Presently two of the members
are male and one female.
7.4.4.2. Competent court according to the regulation on jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgements
Rules determining which national court is competent are providedfor in the
Brussels Regulation on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in
civil and commercial matters.117 This regulation establishes extra protection
for employees and consumers. There are no special rules for discrimination
cases.
7.4.5. Legal Standing - group action
Article 7(3) of the Directive on equal treatment in the provision of goods
and services provides that
3. Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations or other legal
entities, which have, in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national
law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are
complied with, may engage, on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his
118 Case C-89/90, Verholen [1991] ECR I-3757.
119 Case C-185/97, Coote [1998] ECR I-5199.
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or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for the
enforcement of obligations under this Directive.
The right to legal protection is further reinforced by the possibility of
allowing organisations to exercise such rights on behalf of a victim.
In the Hejderijk case118 the ECJ indicated that the principles of effective
judicial protection and effectiveness may lead to a ‘locus standi’ for a
person who has no ‘locus standi’ under national law. 
7.4.6. Time limits
Article 7(1) of the Directive on equal treatment in the provision of goods
and services provides that (emphasis added):
1. Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures,
including where they deem it appropriate conciliation procedures, for the
enforcement of the obligations under this Directive are available to all persons who
consider themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment
to them, even after the relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have
occurred has ended.
As in the earlier discrimination directives, the right to challenge discrimina-
tory behaviour wiith regard to the provision of goods and services extends
to situations in which the relationship between the parties has ended. In
Coote,119 the ECJ held that this follows from the principle of effective
judicial control.
The Directive will not get retroactive effect, applying to such relations-
hips only from the date of its entry into force. National time limits for
initiating action are not affected by this Article. Article 7(4) of the Directive
on equal treatment in the provision of goods and services provides that:
4. Paragraphs 1 and 3 are without prejudice to national rules on time limits for
bringing actions relating to the principle of equal treatment.
National time-bars which may operate as hindrances to the effective
enforcement of rights conferred upon individuals by EU law are usually
adopted out of concern for the principle of legal certainty. When deciding
as to whether to accept them it is therefore necessary to strike a balance
120 See Case C-188/95, Fantask and Others [1997] ECR I-6783, Case C-326/96 Levez
[1998] ECR I-7835  paragraph 19 and Case C-78/98, Preston [2000] ECR ECR I-
3201. 
121 Case C-208/90, Emmott [1991] ECR I-4269.
122 Case C-188/95 Fantask  [1997] ECR I-6783.
123 Case C-246/96, Magorrian [1997] ECR I-7153. 
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between the conflicting general principles of legal certainty and of
effectiveness. 
In EU law in general the main rule is that national time-limits are
considered to fall within the sphere of national procedural autonomy. The
ECJ has thus recognised that it is compatible with Community law for
national rules to prescribe, in the interests of legal certainty, reasonable
limitation periods for bringing proceedings. It cannot be said that this makes
the exercise of rights conferred by Community law either virtually
impossible or excessively difficult, even though the expiry of such
limitation periods entails by definition the rejection, wholly or in part, of the
action brought.120 In a few employment related situations time limits have,
however, been struck down by the ECJ as incompatible with the principle
of effectiveness inherent in EU law. In Emmot121 the ECJ held that
Community law precludes a Member State from relying, in proceedings
brought against it by an individual before the national courts in order to
protect rights directly conferred upon him by a directive, on national proce-
dural rules relating to time-limits for bringing proceedings so long as that
Member State has not properly transposed that directive into its domestic
legal system. This - seemingly far-reaching - ruling has been limited by later
case law. In Fantask,122 the ECJ stated that:
the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of
that case, in which the time-bar had the result of depriving the applicant of any
opportunity whatever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a Community
directive. 
In Magorrian & Cunningham123 the ECJ stated:
2. Community law precludes the application, to a claim based on Article 119 [now
Article 141] of the EC Treaty for recognition of the claimants' entitlement to join
an occupational pension scheme, of a national rule under which such entitlement,
in the event of a successful claim, is limited to a period which starts to run from a
124 Case C-78/98, Preston  [2000] ECR ECR I-3201.
125 Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial [2000] ECR I-4941.
126 93/13/EC.
127 See for example Case C-127/ 92, Enderby [1993] ECR I-5535 paragraph 13.
128 Case C-109/88, Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199.
129 75/117/EEC.
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point in time two years prior to commencement of proceedings in connection with
the claim. 
In Preston and Fletcher124 the ECH confirmed its ruling in Magorrian.
7.4.7. Ex officio application of Community law
In Océano,125 the ECJ held that the effectiveness of EU consumer protection
legislation requires national courts to determine of their own motion
whether a term of a contract is unfair with regard to the directive on unfair
terms in consumer contracts.126 The same principle must apply in discrimi-
nation cases.
7.5. Shift in the Burden of Proof
The ECJ has repeatedly stated127 that it is normally for the person alleging
facts in support of a claim to adduce proof of such facts. Thus, in principle,
the burden of proving the existence of sex discrimination lies with the
person who, believing him- or herself to be the victim of such discrimina-
tion, brings legal proceedings with a view to removing the discrimination.
In Danfoss,128 the ECJ held (emphasis added) that the Equal Pay
Directive129 must be interpreted as meaning that where an undertaking
applies a system of pay which is totally lacking in transparency, it is for the
employer to prove that his practice in the matter of wages is not discrimina-
tory, if a female worker establishes, in relation to a relatively large number
of employees, that the average pay for women is less than that for men. 
7.5.1. Indirect discrimination and lack of transparency
It is clear from the case-law of the ECJ that the onus may shift when that is
necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be the victims of
discrimination of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal
130 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607, at paragraph 31, Case C-33/89,
Kowalska [1990] ECR I-2591, at paragraph 16, C-184/89, Nimz [1991] ECR I-297,
at paragraph 15 and Case C-127/ 92, Enderby [1993] ECR I-5535 paragraph 13.
131 Case 109/88, Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, at paragraph 16. 
132 SEC(2003)1213 p 5. 
133 As in its earlier proposals, the Commission has not included the provision inserted
by the Council in previous directives to the effect that Member States need not
apply the shift of the burden of proof to proceedings in which it is for the court or
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pay. Accordingly, when a measure distinguishing between employees on the
basis of their hours of work has in practice an adverse impact on substantial-
ly more members of one or other sex, that measure must be regarded as
contrary to the objective pursued by Article 141 EC, unless the employer
shows that it is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any
discrimination on grounds of sex.130
Similarly, where an undertaking applies a system of pay which is wholly
lacking in transparency, it is for the employer to prove that his practice in
the matter of wages is not discriminatory, if a female worker establishes, in
relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay for
women is less than that for men.131 As stated in the Staff Working paper
underlying the proposal for the Directive on equal treatment in the provision
of goods and services132 the example of sex discrimination reported include:
Refusal to offer loans to people working part-time.
Banks and other financial institutions which operate such practices will face
the same consequences as to bruden of proof as employers have been met
with in the above judgments.
7.5.2. The Equality directives
The Equality directives contain a standard provision providing for a shift in
the burden of proof to the advange of the person who claims she/he has been
discriminated against. The burden of proof reverts to the respondent once
the plaintiff has established facts before the court or other body from which
it may be presumed that discrimination has taken place. 
As in the earlier discrimination directives and in order to comply with the
provisions of the ECHR, this shift in the burden of proof does not apply to
situations where the criminal law is used to prosecute allegations of
discrimination.133
competent body to investigate the facts of the case. The Commission notes that
there is considerable confusion about the meaning of this provision and believes
that its inclusion would undermine the legal certainty of the article as a whole.
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7.6. Promotion of dialogue with non-governmental organisations.
The Ethnic Equality Directive and the Directive on equal treatment in the
access to and supply of goods and services provide for dialogue with non-
governmental organisations. Member States shall engage in dialogue with
appropriate non-governmental organisations which have, in accordance with
their national law and practice, a legitimate interest in contributing to the
fight against discrimination with a view to promoting the principle of equal
treatment.
7.7.  Specific equality bodies
The Ethnic Equality Directive and the Directive on equal treatment in the
access to and supply of goods and services provide that Member States shall
designate and make the necessary arrangements for a body or bodies for the
promotion, analysis, monitoring and support of equal treatment of all
persons without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin or sex. These
bodies may form part of agencies with responsibility at national level with
the defence of human rights or the safeguard of individuals' rights, or bodies
with responsibility for implementation of the principle of equal treatment
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training
and promotion, and working conditions. Member States shall ensure that the
competencies of the bodies referred to in paragraph 1 include:
(a) providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in
pursuing their complaints about discrimination;
(b) conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination;
(c) publishing independent reports and making recommendations on
any issue relating to such discrimination.
8. Multiple Discrimination in the Application of EU Equality Law
In acordance with the above general rules on enforcement and monitoring
Member States have a very free choice as to how to enforce prohibitions
against discrimination, including multiple discrimination. There are four
main procedural approaches at national level:
134 See Maria Pierce: Minority Ethnic People with Disabilities in Ireland Situation,
Identity and Experience, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University
College Dublin in conjunction with the Institute for the Study of Social Change,
The Equality Authority, Ireland.
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• Ordinary administrative process (eg labour inspectors)
• Industrial relations (collective agreements,works councils)
• Judicial process (litigation in courts)
• Special equality bodies (specialised quasi-judicial bodies, ombudsmen,
and similar bodies).
It is very much up to the Member States to decide how much or little they
will focus on multiple discrimination. The gendermainstreaming aspect, eg
in connection with the promotion of the integration of migrant women is
taken seriously in many countries but other aspects og multiple discrimian-
tion are often disregarded. The Irish Equality Authority has commissioned
some reports on the issue.134
